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Compliance with tax authorities has been studied mainly in the fields of economics and psychology. The focus has respectively been on self-interest motives and justice concerns in tax compliance. We argue that both concerns are less divergent than is often thought. Specifically, we studied the moderating role of distributive justice on the relationship between outcome favorability and tax compliance in two cross-sectional surveys. It is generally believed that favorable outcomes increase compliance because they decrease what can be gained from non-compliance. The present research addresses the role of distributive justice in this process.  Since people believe that distributive fairness guarantees their long-term outcomes, favorable present outcomes now imply favorable future outcomes and unfavorable present outcomes now imply unfavorable future outcomes. Thus, we expected fair outcomes to result in a strong relationship between outcome favorability and compliance. On the basis that unfair outcomes are believed to result from chance, outcome favorability should have a weaker relationship with compliance when outcomes are unfair. Even when controlling for other variables, this prediction was supported by both studies.





A Self-Interest Analysis of Tax Compliance: How Distributive Justice Moderates the Effect of Outcome Favorability
In recent decades, the study of tax compliance has become  increasingly important  (for an overview, see Kirchler, 2007). Tax compliance refers to the willingness of people to comply with tax authorities by paying their taxes. Modern societies rely heavily on the fact that most people comply with tax laws. It is therefore important to understand why people comply with tax authorities and thereby  identify mechanisms that underlie people’s decisions to be compliant or not. This knowledge may guide authorities towards the development of strategies that  strengthen compliance and fight non-compliance. Attempts to understand the processes involved in tax compliance have been pursued in two lines of research. The first focuses on how people’s desire to maximize their self-interests can be aligned with, or countered by, tax systems. This approach, based on the formal economic model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), has dominated economic analyses of tax compliance (Andreoni, Erard, & Feinstein, 1998). The second line of research utilizes psychological and sociological analyses of tax compliance. Here, the focus is on the interaction between tax authorities and citizens, on norms that guide citizens’ behavior, and on the fairness of tax systems and tax outcomes ( Kirchler & Hoelzl, 2006). 
Economic and psychological approaches are often viewed at best as complementary, and at worst as mutually exclusive approaches. The present research attempts to increase our understanding of why people comply with tax authorities by showing that economic and psychological approaches are not necessarily as divergent as is often thought. More specifically, because self-interest considerations play an important role in why people care about distributive justice (e.g., Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Skitka, 2003), we argue that the degree to which  tax outcomes are perceived to be fair should play an important role in a self-interest analysis of tax compliance. The present study therefore examines the moderating role of distributive justice in the relation between the favourability of tax outcomes and compliance with tax authorities. It should be noted, however, that whilst we are not the first to propose an integration of economic, psychological, and sociological analyses of tax compliance (e.g., Cullis & Lewis, 1997), our research attempts to directly test predictions derived from an explicit integration of these views. 
From a theoretical perspective, the present study aims to increase our understanding of the interactive processes of two concepts in the context of tax compliance, concepts considered by many to be interchangeable (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Skitka, Winquist, & Hutchinson, 2003). As argued below, the study may also help clarify the divergent findings of previous studies, which sometimes found support for the role of distributive justice in tax compliance, and sometimes did not.  (e.g., Alm, McClelland, & Schulz,1992; Webley, Morris, & Amstutz, 1985). From a practical perspective, we also aim to emphasize that tax authorities should view outcome favorability and outcome fairness as separate constructs that both need to be considered in order to enhance compliance with decisions of tax authorities. 
Self-Interest and Tax Compliance
The traditional economic approach of tax compliance (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972) views tax payers as rational actors who intend to maximize their profits. In this approach, it is assumed that people’s decisions to comply with tax authorities are motivated by economic self-interest.  In order to counterbalance the profits that can be gained from non-compliance, authorities attempt to deter people from tax evasion with threats of penalties and fines. The key concept in this analysis is deterrence, which is often split up into two sub-concepts: the probability that tax evasion is detected and the severity of sanctions. According to the economic model of tax compliance, it is chiefly the interaction between probability of detection and sanction severity that should affect non-compliance. Some important empirical and review studies about the effects of deterrence on compliance include: Williams and Hawkins (1986), Klepper and Nagin (1989), Paternoster (1987), Carrol (1987), Fisher, Wartwick, & Mark (1992), Hessing et al. (1992), Hasseldine (2000) and Torgler (2002) and recently Kirchler (2007). From these studies we may conclude that both the probability of detection and the severity of sanctions generally have minor  positive effect on compliance. However, the uneven nature of previous findings indicates that the causal relation between deterrence and compliance has yet to be fully understood. 
Perhaps the most obvious limitation of the economic self-interest analysis of tax compliance is that it cannot account for the relatively high levels of observed tax compliance (Bordignon, 1993). In other words, if deterrence (i.e., probability of detection and sanction severity) would be the most important variable in explaining compliance, rational people in most countries of the world would be non-compliant because levels of deterrence are generally low (Graetz & Wilde, 1985; Porcano, 1988; Elffers, 2000, Braithwaite, 2003). Moreover, contrary to predictions of economic models, Frey (2003) reported that deterrence can even have a negative effect on compliance. That is, people sometimes evade more when deterrence rises. Indeed, he maintains that too much deterrence may decrease the intrinsic motivation to comply (the “crowding out effect”).
Nevertheless, as argued below, self-interest motives can be important in analyses of tax compliance. Rather than focusing on the means that authorities have to counter noncompliance – i.e., deterrence  we focus here on how authorities can align tax payers’ self-interests with compliance. A relevant finding that is consistent with a self-interest view of tax compliance is that if people consider the outcomes of the decisions made by authorities as favorable, then they are generally more willing to co-operate and be compliant; conversely, unfavorable outcomes can negatively affect compliance with tax authorities (Murphy, 2004). Favorable outcomes in a taxation context usually refer to having to pay less tax than was expected. Presumably, people are more willing to comply with tax authorities when their decisions or those of the tax system are considered favorable because they expect less to gain from being noncompliant (Wenzel, 2002).
Justice and Tax Compliance
To understand the high observed levels of compliance, approaches other than purely economic ones have been proposed (i.e., Cullis & Lewis, 1997). Sociological and psychological insights have proved to be important in understanding the high levels of compliance (Scholz & Lubell, 1998; Alm, McClelland, & Schulze, 1999; Braithwaite, 2003; Wenzel, 2004a). In such analyses, concepts like trust in authorities (Murphy, 2004), perceived fairness of the tax system (e.g. Porcano, 1984; Tyler, 1990; Wenzel, 2004a), and moral considerations and norms (Frey, 2003; Wenzel, 2004b) are used to foster  a more comprehensive understanding of tax compliance. For an overview, see Kirchler (2007). The present study addresses the role of justice in compliance with tax authorities by examining the effect of distributive justice in this process.
Distributive justice refers to perceptions of the extent to which outcomes match implicit norms, such as equality or equity. Equity theory (Adams, 1965) states that in exchange relations, people compare the ratio of their contributions (e.g., effort) and compensation (e.g., money) with others’ contribution/compensation ratio. Thus, when people apply the equity norm, they may think it fair that others earn more than they do when these others work harder. When contribution/compensation ratios are unequal, people are dissatisfied and attempt to equalize them, for instance by decreasing their effort (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). In the taxation context, distributive justice refers to the feeling that everyone pays his fair share of taxes, and that one does not pay too much (or too little). If society does not offer enough (tax funded) resources compared to the amount of tax one must  pay, this may lead to feelings of distributive injustice (exchange inequity). Comparison of one’s own tax burden to that of others who pay less can also cause feelings of distributive injustice (horizontal inequity; Dean, Keenan, & Kennedy, 1980). 
A general explanation of why people care about distributive justice is that it ensures optimal personal outcomes in the long run (e.g., van Avermaet, McClintock, & Moskowitz, 1978; Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978; see Skitka, 2003, for a theoretical account; see Tyler, Boeckman, Smith, & Huo, 1997, for an overview of empirical research; see Wenzel, 2002, for a somewhat different view; we return to this in the discussion). Fairly distributed outcomes make people believe that their outcomes are guaranteed in the long run (i.e., they expect to share in the societal provisions that are paid for taxes ). Unfair outcomes, on the other hand, are believed to result from unstable and unpredictable forces, giving people no reason to support the distribution rules or the authorities responsible for  these rules. Consequently, it is often more profitable to let one’s behavior guided by the fairness of outcomes (i.e., by complying with authorities) rather than by short-term personal profits because fair outcomes guarantee long term profit. In sum, as this analysis elucidates, self-interest is a guiding principle which explains why people value fair outcomes.
Distributive justice is considered to play an important role in the process of tax compliance (Tyler, 1997; Wenzel, 2003). Nevertheless, the reported effects of distributive justice on compliance are not always consistent. Whilst positive effects are found in some studies, others report none. In an experimental study, Spicer and Becker (1980) showed that an unfair ratio of one’s own tax burden with that of others can lead to tax non-compliance. However, the validity of this study is questionable because the participants were explicitly instructed to maximize their own profit, thereby  framing the study as a (short term) self-interest situation. An experiment by Alm, McClelland, and Schulz (1992) further supported the negative effect of inequity on compliance. Equity principles were also experimentally tested by Moser, Evans, and Kim (1995) and Kim, Evans, and Moser (2005) within an economic self-interest framework. In these studies it was shown that justice and economic considerations are both of importance in explaining the amount of reported income (under-reporting thus implicating  tax evasion). These studies were laboratory experiments designed to mimic a real life taxation context. Another form of distributive justice, the effect of changes in taxation on peoples’ reported compliance, was investigated by Calderwood and Webley (1992). They found that people who felt that they had unjustifiably paid more than before negatively affected their compliance. A similar result was reported by Porcano (1988), who found that the perceived exchange inequity likewise negatively affects compliance. Finally, these findings are corroborated by Maroney, Rupert, and Anderson (1998) who concluded that the perceived injustice of taxing a particular income type may even affect the compliance on other income types.
However, in a study by Webley, Morris, and Amstutz (1985), the equity effect on tax evasion was not found although this might have attributable to flaws in the experimental design (Webley et al., 1991). Having said that, Mason and Calvin (1978) found no relation between exchange and horizontal equity perceptions and self-reported compliance either. Furthermore, in a comparison of convicted tax evaders and non evaders, Wallschutsky (1984) likewise found no differences in exchange equity perceptions. However, this may have resulted from flaws in the procedure because subsequent interviews with the respondents revealed that exchange equity was an important factor in evasion decisions. 
In conclusion, although some studies failed to reveal distributive justice effects on tax compliance, there remains strong evidence that the various forms of distributive justice play an important role in establishing tax compliance. Whilst this general observation provides the staring point for the present study, it adopts a different approach. Below , we develop the argument that distributive justice is important for understanding tax compliance, not only because it directly affects compliance, but also because it affects how other variables are implicated .
The Role of Self-Interest in Social Justice
In line with previous research, we expect that distributive justice will have a positive effect on tax compliance (Hypothesis 1). On the basis of other studies (e.g., Murphy, 2004; Wenzel, 2002), we also expect outcome favorability to positively affect tax compliance (Hypothesis 2). Note that although distributive justice is related to outcome favorability, social scientists often substitute one construct for another (e.g., Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996) despite the fact that each has a distinct conceptual meaning (Skitka, Winquist & Hutchinson, 2003). Outcomes can be favorable without being fair. To illustrate this difference in the context of taxation , receiving a tax refund because of tax deduction related to a mortgage is probably viewed as a favorable outcome. Nevertheless, this outcome may be considered unfair if one discovers that the neighbor received a larger refund for owning a bigger house with a larger mortgage.
Most importantly, we expect that the relationship between outcome favorability and compliance with tax authorities is contingent on the extent to which tax outcomes are considered distributively fair. As noted above, the more taxpayers consider outcomes of tax decisions as favorable to themselves, the less they should expect  further gains from tax noncompliance; as such, they can be expected to be more compliant to the tax office. However, we expect that this effect is stronger when outcomes are also viewed as fair. Specifically, a fair distribution of outcomes makes people expect that outcomes are guaranteed in the long run. It should therefore follow that outcome favorability has a positive effect on tax compliance when outcomes are also considered to be fair because favorable present outcomes imply favorable future outcomes. Unfavorable outcomes should result in relatively low levels of compliance because the unfavorable present outcome suggests unfavorable future outcomes. However, when tax outcomes are considered distributively unfair, people believe that the favorability of their outcomes is unpredictable. The tax office may in the future make favorable or unfavorable decisions, but this is hard to tell. In this situation, we expect a weaker relation between outcome favorability and compliance because the outcome of the taxpayer’s contribution is unpredictable and there is no reason to support the taxation system. 
Study overview
In sum, we expect that distributive justice and outcome favorability positively affect compliance (Hypothesis 1 and 2, respectively), and, more importantly, that the positive effect of outcome favorability on compliance is particularly strong if people experience relatively high levels of distributive justice. If distributive justice is considered to be low, we expect the effect of outcome favourability to be weaker. In other, words we expect that distributive justice moderates the positive effect of outcome favorability on compliance (hypothesis 3). 
Our hypotheses were tested with two cross sectional surveys. The first survey consists of data that are annually collected by the Dutch tax office across a representative sample of Dutch private tax payers.  The second survey was designed to address some shortcomings in the first study. Here we collected data from a representative sample of Dutch employees. We decided to use the survey method because the causal effects of distributive justice and of outcome favorability on tax compliance appear clear. An advantage of using a representative sample of the population is that conclusions can be generalized to the relevant population, while controlling for a host of other relevant variables. In addition to controlling for demographic variables, we controlled for the effects of self-interest other than outcome favorability. Thus, the deterrence concepts probability of detection and severity of sanctions are also taken into account. Furthermore, perhaps the most important factor in explaining tax compliance is people’s personal tax norm (also referred to as personal tax ethics or personal tax morale, see Torgler, 2002; Wenzel, 2004a; 2004b; 2005). 
Tax morale is usually defined as the intrinsic motivation to comply. Most studies, like ours, take personal norm or tax morale as an explanatory variable for predicting the the level of compliance. One of the earliest studies by Schwartz and Orleans (1967) showed that moral appeals were more effective than deterrence in increasing compliance. Research, primarily by Torgler, has highlighted those factors that may be important for increasing tax morale (e.g. Torgler, 2003; Torgler & Murphy, 2005).  Important factors that positively influence tax morale are trust in the authorities and religiosity. In some situations, sanctions may also increase personal norm, provided that the authority exercising the sanction is trusted (Mulder, Verboon, de Cremer, 2007). Although personal norm is not necessary affected by self-interest considerations, the results may be seriously biased if the effect of this variable is not controlled. Therefore, personal norms are also taken into account.
Study 1: Dutch Fiscal Monitor
Method
Participants. The first study used data from  the Dutch Fiscal Monitor Survey (Van Altena & Verschoor, 2006) which was based on a random sample of 744 Dutch citizens aged 16 years and above . The sample consisted of 401 men (54%) and 343 females (46%): 37% were younger than 40 years, 36% were between 40 and 60 years, and 27% were older than 60 years of age. Of the respondents, 3% had only received a primary education , 33% had followed their primary education with secondary education only, 29% had followed their secondary education with vocational education, and 34% had attended university. About 23% of the respondents lived alone , 31% resided in a two-person household without children, and 41% were (married) couples with children. The remaining respondents (5%) lived in an alternative form of household. Over two-third of the respondents (70%) owned the property in which they were living , whilst the remaining 30% lived in rented accommodation. . About 4% of the respondents were entrepreneurs, 11% worked within the civil service, 49% were employed in the commercial sector and 36% were currently unemployed or retired.
Procedure.  The data were collected by a marketing bureau that uses an access panel which is representative of the Dutch population. Two types of data collection were used. From their database, respondents were randomly selected (N = 176, 24%) from a subpopulation of people without a computer or not connected to the internet. For this group face-to-face interviews were used. The remaining respondents (N = 568, 76%) were randomly selected from the database and requested to fill in an electronic questionnaire on the internet. The interviews were conducted by professional interviewers. Participants were told that the confidentiality of their responses was guaranteed. By using a laptop computer, participants could type their answers out of sight of the interviewer to avoid social desirability bias on some of the sensitive questions. Confidentiality was also guaranteed to the respondents that used the internet questionnaire. 
Measures. Tax compliance was measured with five items (Cronbach’s   = .85): the intention to evade paying income tax or exaggerating deductions, how one felt about not evading income tax or exaggerating deductions, and the acceptability of tax evasion. For instance, intention was measured by: “If I had the possibility, I would evade paying taxes” (1 = completely agree, 7 = completely disagree). The average score over the five items was taken as an index for tax compliance.
In order to measure perceived deterrence, we distinguished the concepts of detection probability and sanction severity. Sanction severity was measured with four items (Cronbach’s  =.65). Respondents indicated on a seven-point scale (1 = very unlikely, 7= very likely) how likely they thought a particular sanction for tax evasion was. The items referred to: paying the tax with a relatively small fine, paying a substantial fine, being audited in more detail in the future , and criminal prosecution. These items were similar to the ones reported in Wenzel (2002, 2004a).
Probability of detection was measured with three items (Cronbach’s  =.61): the probability of being detected after under-reporting income or exaggerating deductions, the probability that the tax office finds out that someone has received cash-in-hand payments, and the probability that the tax office finds out about fiscal constructions (1 = very low, 7 = very high). The three topics were based on Wenzel (2002, 2004a). The average score over the three items was taken as an index for probability of detection.
Distributive justice was measured with one item: “In my opinion the tax office takes care that everyone pays the right amount of tax” (1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree).
Two items (r = .34) were used to measure outcome favorability. The items were derived from Tyler’s (1997) instrumental judgment index. The items were: “Decisions of the tax office are favorable to me” and “I usually agree with the decisions of the tax office” (1 = completely disagree, 5 = completely agree).
Finally, personal tax norm was measured with “I feel morally obliged to honestly declare all my tax liabilities”. The appendix presents the exact wording of all items.
Analyses. The hypotheses were tested using hierarchical regression analyses. Five demographic characteristics were assessed: gender , age ( < 40,  40  60, > 60), education (seven levels), household type (single/ more than one person), and religion ( Roman Catholic, protestant, other religion, no religion). These variables were used as control variables in the regression model. The variables age, education and religion were first analyzed with the SPSS Catreg  procedure (Van der Kooij, Meulman, & Heiser, 2004) to obtain optimally scaled categories for these variables. This provided nominal transformations of age and religion and ordinal transformations of education. Scaled categories may reveal nonlinear relationships between these variables and the dependent variable. As such, the scaled categories were entered in the first step of the ordinary least squares regression. 
In step two, the deterrence variables (probability of detection and sanction severity) were entered together with their interaction. In step three, both the main effects of the psychological variables(distributive justice and outcome favorability) and their interaction were entered. Personal tax norm was entered in the final step. To avoid multicollinearity, the interaction terms were derived from standardized versions of the predictors (Aiken & West, 1991). Subsequently, simple slopes analyses were performed to clarify the interaction effect of distributive justice and outcome favorability.
Results
The scaled categories of age showed that age had a nonlinear relationship with compliance (larger scaling values indicate more compliance). The youngest group (below 40) obtained a scaling value of 0.00 (approximately the mean), the 40-60 year group a value of -1.09, and the older group a scaling value of 1.45. People above 60 appeared to be more compliant than the others, whereas the middle group was the least compliant. 
The four categories of religion clearly differed on compliance: Protestants (0.72), and even more so people with “another religion” (3.52), were the most compliant. People without religion were the least compliant (-0.77), and Catholics were somewhere in the middle (-.05). Education was virtually linearly related to compliance: higher education indicates more compliance. 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the variables and intercorrelations. All independent variables have significant but weak correlations with compliance; only personal tax norm is strongly correlated with compliance. Except probability of detection and sanction severity, all independent variables are correlated with each other. The personal tax norm (M = 4.21, SD = 0.81) proved to be particularly high.
Results of the hierarchical regression analysis are shown in Table 2.1 In Step 1, gender , age, education and religion significantly affect compliance. Women indicated higher compliance than men. Age, religion and education, all scaled as noted above, had the same effects as were observed in the Catreg procedure. 
In the second step, both probability of detection and perceived severity of sanctions significantly affected compliance. However, the interaction between the two deterrent variables  was not significant. The deterrence variables add a significant 3% to the R2.
In step three, the interaction between distributive justice and outcome favorability was positive and significant, which supports our hypothesis that outcome favorability has a stronger effect on compliance if distributive justice is high. The interaction term yielded a small but significant2 contribution to the R2. The main effect of outcome favorability was only marginally significant whereas the main effect of distributive justice was not significant.
The final step showed that the personal tax norm is a very important predictor of compliance (adding about 11% to the R2). However, even with personal tax norm in the model, the interaction between outcome favorability and distributive justice  was still significant. 
The results of the simple slopes analysis further support our expectations (see Figure 2). When distributive justice is low (that is, 1 SD below the mean), outcome favorability did not significantly affect compliance ( = -.07, n.s.). When distributive justice is high (1 SD above the mean), outcome favorability significantly, and positively, affected compliance ( = .12, p < .05).
Study 2: Dutch Employees Survey
The results of study 1 clearly support our central prediction: The positive effect of the favorability of tax outcomes on compliance with the tax authorities depended on the extent to which these outcomes were perceived to be fair. Specifically, only when outcomes were viewed as fair did outcome favorability positively affect tax compliance. When outcomes  were unfair, outcome favorability was unrelated to tax compliance. Importantly, these results were obtained while controlling for the effects of a host of known important variables that affect tax compliance, varying from structural background variables, such as education level and income to psychological variables, such as perceived deterrence. 
Although these results are promising, they demand replication. Moreover, study 1 is obviously not without its limitations. Therefore we conducted a subsequent study to replicate the findings of study 1 and to address several of its shortcomings  in measuring key concepts of our model. First, in study 1, distributive justice was measured with one item only. Although this item clearly refers to justice and distributional aspects of tax paying, it can be argued that it is limited in focus. In fact, the item refers to an evaluation of the tax office’s efficiency in its dealings with fair distributions of tax burdens. In order to more comprehensively measure this concept, distributive justice in study 2 was measured with five items. Second, in study 1, outcome favorability was measured with two items taken from Tyler (1997), which referred to outcome favorability of the tax office’s decisions. We added an additional item that directly focused on actual tax liability (i.e., the favorability of tax outcomes), without referring to procedures. 
Method
Procedure and participants. The sample was extracted from the national postal guide. Extraction criteria were that people worked for an organization for at least eight hours a week and that they had a supervisor. Only those who had given permission to disclose their address for research purposes were included. 973 Dutch people were sent a letter inviting them  to participate in “a study about experience at work in The Netherlands” by filling out the enclosed questionnaire and returning it to the researchers in the prepaid envelope. It was also explained that there were no “right” or “wrong” answers, that the questionnaire would take about twenty minutes to complete, and  that participation would be completely anonymous. Of these 973 questionnaires, 16 were returned because the addressee no longer lived there. This left  957 questionnaires that actually reached the intended respondents. A reminder was sent to all intended respondents two weeks after the first mailing.
In total, 359 questionnaires were returned (38 %). The response rate is somewhat higher than other studies in this area, for instance the Australian Hopes and Fears Survey (Braithwaite, 2000) which had a response rate of 29%. The sample consisted of 65 % males and 35 % females. Of the respondents, 2 % had only received primary education , 39 % had followed their primary education with  secondary education only, 25 % had followed  their secondary education with vocational education, 23 % had a bachelor degree, 9 % had a masters degree, and 1 % indicated they had received an “another” type of education. About 38 % had a net monthly salary below € 1500, 35 % earned between € 1500 and 2000, 14 earned between € 2000 and 2500, and 14 earned more than € 2500. The mean age was 42.71 (SD = 10.26). The respondents had worked, on average, for 11.94 years with their current organization (SD = 10.66) and had been in their current job for 8.49 years (SD = 9.93).
Measures. Tax compliance was measured with three items (Cronbach’s   = .68). The items consisted of statements about hypothetical cash-in-hand payments, for example “Under certain circumstances I may choose not to declare my cash payments” (1 = completely agree, 5 = completely disagree). The average score over the three items provided an index for tax compliance.
To measure perceived deterrence, we again distinguished between the concepts of probability of detection and sanction severity. Sanction severity was measured with one item that directly asked for the perceived severity of the sanction (1 = not severe, 5 = very severe). Three items (Cronbach’s   = .62) measured probability of detection, for example “The probability of being detected when evading tax is low” (1 = completely agree, 5 = completely disagree). 
Distributive justice was measured using five items (Cronbach’s   = .73). One example is: “It is unfair that some people have to pay lower taxes than me but at the same time take advantage of all sorts of benefits” (1 = completely agree, 5 = completely disagree).
Three items (Cronbach’s   = .72) were used to measure outcome favorability. Two items, like in the first study, were based on Tyler (1997). The  third additional item was : “When I receive my tax liabities  , it is usually higher  than I expected”(1 = completely agree, 5 = completely disagree). 
Finally, personal tax norm was measured with the item “I feel morally obliged to pay all my taxes ”. The exact wording of all items can be found in the appendix.
Analyses. Hierarchical regression was used to analyze the data, with variables entered in the same steps as in Study 1. Again, the interaction terms were derived from standardized versions of the predictors. Before the regression was conducted, optimal scaling values of the demographic variables age (recoded in three categories; below 35, between 35 and 50, and older than 50) without order restrictions and education (with ordinal measurement restrictions) were obtained by the Catreg procedure. 
Results
The optimally scaled values for the three age categories indicated the most compliance amongst  the oldeest group (1.41) and the least  amongst the youngest (-1.20). The middle  group had the scaled value -.22. Thus, we found an ordinal relationship between age groups and compliance. The enforced ordinal transformation of education yielded a less smooth transformation than in the first study because the two lowest categories obtained the same scaled value. Moreover, the two highest categories also obtained the same scaled value. Figure 1 shows the transformations of education. Only sex and age contributed significantly to the prediction of compliance.
Descriptive statistics of the variables and intercorrelations are shown in Table 3. All independent variables  had significant but weak correlations with compliance expect for two: sanction severity which had a zero correlation with compliance; and personal tax morale which has a strong correlation with compliance. All independent variables were correlated except for probability of detection and outcome favorability. Sanction severity was negatively correlated with personal tax morale and distributive justice, but positively correlated with probability of detection.
Results of the hierarchical regression analysis are shown in Table 4. In the first step, gender and age had significant effects, meaning as before that females indicated more compliance than men, and that older people are more compliant.
In line with the first study, the second step showed that the probability of detection had a positive and significant effect on compliance. However, perceived severity of sanctions had no effect on compliance. Again, the interaction between the two deterrent variables  was not significant.
When distributive justice, outcome favorability and their interaction were entered in the regression model3, both main effects and the interaction were  significant. Remarkably, the effect of education increased in this step but had  a negative regression coefficient. 
In the final step, personal tax norm had a strong and significant effect on compliance. The interaction between distributive justice and outcome favorability remained positive and significant4, which supports our hypothesis that outcome favorability has a stronger positive effect on compliance if distributive justice is high. Entering the personal tax norm weakened the effect of probability of detection, which was no longer significant at p <.05. In addition, the main effect of distributive justice was weakened when personal tax norm was entered, but it remained significant.
Figure 3 shows the results of the simple slopes analysis for the interaction. For those people who experience relatively low distributive justice (that is, 1 SD below the mean), outcome favorability had no significant effect on compliance ( = -.03, n.s.). For those who experience high levels of distributive justice (1 SD above the mean), outcome favorability had a strong effect ( = .25, p < .01) on compliance.
Discussion
Taken together, the results of both studies clearly support our central prediction that the effect of outcome favorability on tax compliance is moderated by distributive justice. Specifically, in both studies, no effect of the favorability of people’s outcomes on tax compliance was found when distributive justice was low. And in both studies, we found a significant positive effect of outcome favorability on people’s compliance with the tax authorities’ decisions when distributive justice was high. Distributive justice is clearly related to outcome concerns, and more specifically, concerns about the predictability of one’s outcomes (e.g., Skitka, 2003). Thus, the general argument that there is less to gain from non-compliance as the authorities’ decisions become more favorable  needs to be qualified by the extent to which these  decisions are viewed as predictable In short, there is less to gain from non-compliance when outcomes are more favorable only when the outcomes result from predictable decisions. The present study can therefore be viewed as providing further evidence that  people’s concerns for distributive justice  derive from self-interest motives. Furthermore, self-interest has proved to be an important  psychological factor underlying  tax compliance .
One may question why we viewed distributive justice as a moderator of the effect of the favorability of tax outcomes on tax compliance rather than viewing outcome favorability as a moderator of the effect of distributive justice on tax compliance. In other words, one could predict that the fairness of tax outcomes has a positive effect on compliance with the tax authorities only when such outcomes are also favorable. We believe that this view does not seriously change our argument concerning the predictability of future outcomes. In a self-interest analysis of tax compliance, we expect that people only value predictable outcomes resulting from distributively fair outcomes when such outcomes are also favorable. When outcomes are unfavorable, predictability is less likely to increase compliance with the tax authorities. Nevertheless, we believe that it is interesting to note that viewing outcome favorability as a moderator of distributive justice effects may explain some of the empirical inconsistencies of previous research, which often found a positive effect of distributive justice on tax compliance, but sometimes failed to reveal such an effect. 
The support for our hypotheses concerning the main effects of outcome favorability and distributive justice was less unequivocal. Both studies yielded positive and significant correlations between outcome favorability, distributive justice, and compliance, but the values were larger in study two (see Table 1 and 3, respectively). In the regression model of study 1, the main effect of outcome favorability was not significant, whereas in study 2, a significant main effect for outcome favorability was found in the final specification. The main effect of distributive justice also differs between the two studies: although a significant effect was found in study 2, no such effect was found in study 1. One possible reason for this difference is that different aspects of distributive justice were being measured (a similar argument was put forward by Kirchler, 2007). In study 1, distributive justice refers to horizontal and vertical equity whereas study 2 focused on exchange equity. The empirical differences between the two studies may also be explained by differences in the way that the respective questionnaires were framed (see Kahnemann & Tversky, 1979). The fiscal monitor consisted entirely of tax related matters. In the employees survey, the compliance items were preceded by items about working conditions and related issues. Framing effects are also present in the tax context (Kinsey, Grasmick, & Smith, 1991; Verboon, 2006). Nevertheless, we believe that the most parsimonious  and likely explanation for the stronger effects in study 2 is simply that we measured outcome favorability and distributive justice more reliably. 
Further testimony to the validity of our results is that the interaction effect, which was our primary concern, was found regardless of whether we controlled for demographic and psychological background variables . Moreover, the results concerning the demographic variables were generally in line with the literature (e.g., Spicer & Lundstedt, 1976; Porcano, 1988). Women tend to be more compliant than men, and older people are the most compliant (Wenzel, 2005). Interestingly, we found in the first study that the youngest group was more compliant than the middle group. It may be interesting to examine this phenomenon more carefully in future studies. In line with the literature, religion was also found to be related to compliance (Grasmick, Kinsey & Cochran, 1991). Religious people are generally more compliant than non religious people, which may be due to a higher personal morale on ethical issues, like tax evasion. The effect of education in study 1 mirrors the results reported by de Juan, Lasheras, and Mayo (1994) who argue that higher educated people better understand why tax has to be paid and therefore tend to be more compliant. In the second study, however, there was no direct correlation between education and compliance, a result that was also reported by Wenzel (2005). Moreover, after controlling for outcome favorability and distributive justice, the regression coefficient of education became significantly negative in study 2. This unexpected result may mean that people with similar attitudes about justice and outcome favorability (i.e., the better educated ones) are less compliant. 
The results concerning the effects of our psychological background variables are also generally in line with the literature. First, the self-interest variable, probability of detection, positively affected compliance in both studies, although in study 1 the effect was rendered nonsignificant when personal tax morale was entered in the regression. These results correspond to those reported by Wenzel (2004a). However, only in study one was sanction severity positively correlated with compliance. It should be noted that the absence of a sanction effect on compliance has been reported before (e.g. Varma & Doob, 1998). Not finding an effect of sanction severity may also be due to the fact that in the second study sanction severity was only measured with one general item , whereas in study 1, respondents had to gauge the likelihood of four possible sanctions. Most respondents probably have no experience with being sanctioned by the tax office. It thus follows that a single, general question about how the severity of sanctions is perceived, as was done in study 2, may not be a valid measure of this concept. Respondents should preferably be presented with the actual consequences of their choice, as was done in the first study, in order to more validly assess sanction severity5. Moreover, the sanction item from study 2 may have been interpreted as a judgment of the sanction system of tax evasion, which would explain why this item correlated negatively with distributive justice. People who do not agree with the tax office, or perceive distributive injustice, tend to find sanctions too severe. Also in line with most of the literature, no support was found for a multiplicative effect (Carroll, 1987) of the two deterrence concepts. In sum, however, we maintain that regardless of whether deterrence is controlled , our main conclusion about the effect of justice perceptions and self-interest on compliance holds.
The present study employed measures of perceived deterrence (i.e., perceived probability of detection and perceived sanction severity). One may think that such measures are prone to unnecessary biases. In fact, some experimental studies, have used actual detection probability instead of subjective perceptions (Fischer et al., 1992). However, focusing on perceived detection probability, as we did in the present study, has several advantages. First, actual probability of detecting tax evasion, or even the actual audit rate, is hard to estimate because in the Dutch tax system it depends partly on random selection, partly on risk evaluation, and partly on specific campaigns. Second, subjective estimation of the detection probability is more important for actual compliance behavior and may only partly depend on actual probabilities. Andreoni et al. (1998) even note that actual audit probabilities have little effect on compliance. They suggest that moral obligations are related to overestimating the probability of detection. In this respect, it is interesting to note that our findings, support Andreoni et al’s suggestion since we found significant positive correlations between the personal tax morale and perceived detection probability. .
We do not claim that distributive justice matters to people merely because of self-interest considerations alone. Indeed, there is evidence that distributive justice concerns can also derive from group interest concerns (e.g., Wenzel, 2001, 2004c). Specifically, the categorization that people use to define themselves appears to be important in shaping people’s entitlement beliefs: people believe that they are entitled to the same outcomes as other members of their category. Deservingness (i.e., equity), on the other hand, appears to be related to category defining characteristics. It seems worthwhile to pursue this line of study in the context of compliance to tax authorities because this would surly broaden our insights into a severely understudied phenomenon: namely; group level justice in the context of tax compliance. For instance, some groups in society may have better opportunities than others to minimize their tax burden and these can promote feelings of intergroup injustice. Like distributive justice at the interpersonal level, we expect that group level outcome favorability will interact in a similar way with this type of distributive justice, because minimizing your tax burden is a typical self-interest concept, for which the same argument could be used as was developed in the present study. The difference that we expect is that people care about the extent to which their group’s outcomes are fair and favorable. In other words, we don’t expect people, at least those who strongly identify with their group, to pursue their own interests, but rather the interests of their group.
In the literature on social justice, a robust finding is that outcome favorability interacts with another type of justice: procedural justice. Distributive justice shows the same interaction with procedural justice, which has been taken as evidence that outcome favorability and distributive justice are to a large extent interchangeable; see for instance Brocker & Wiesenfeld, 1996, 2003). Procedural justice refers to the fairness of procedures, the fairness of their enactment by authorities, and the fairness of the interpersonal treatment by authorities (see Colquit 2001, for an overview). As procedural justice has been shown to play an important role in the process of tax compliance (see Wenzel, 2003, for an overview), future research may wish to further investigate this interaction effect . Importantly, the form that this interaction takes is different from what we both predicted and found, i.e., regarding the interaction between distributive justice and outcome favorability: Outcomes were found to have a weaker effect when procedures were perceived to be fair. Moreover, this interaction cannot be explained by self-interest explanations alone ; social identity based explanations clearly have a role in this interaction. The implication for practice is that it is sufficient to focus on one concern only: either procedural justice, or outcome favorability.
Interestingly, some research in the area of distributive justice already suggests that the predicted interaction between procedural and distributive justice may be found in the context of tax compliance. Indeed, Maroney, Rupert, and Anderson (1998) predicted (from the equity control model) and found that inequity increases reluctance to comply (i.e. tax evasion) when tax payers don’t have control over their tax outcomes through other means. Control, as operationalized in the equity control model, strongly echoes process- and decision-control in the procedural justice literature (i.e. voice) and, as noted above, this interaction effect (i.e., strong distributive justice effects when people have low control over their outcomes when procedural justice is low) has been found in numerous studies in the procedural justice literature (see Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996, 2003 for overviews). Thus, Maroney et al’s study not only provides initial evidence that procedural and distributive justice have an interactive effect  on tax compliance, but the similarities between the models indicate that the equity control model may be extended to include many more qualifiers of the effects of equity on tax compliance (e.g.,  bias suppression, accuracy, but also interpersonal treatment by authorities; see for instance Levanthal, 1980, and Bies & Moag, 1986).
Obviously, the present studies are not without their limitations. Both studies applied a cross-sectional design, with all variables derived from people’s individual perceptions. Not only are we unable to derive causal conclusions from this approach, but such a design is also problematic because the main effects may be attributable to common method bias. However, it should be noted that the interaction effect, which was of primary interest, cannot be attributed to common method variance. On the contrary, as common method bias tends to inflate main effects, it tends to suppress interaction effects (McClelland & Judd, 1993; Evans, 1985). Thus, the limited proportion of variance explained by our interaction should not be viewed as having limited practical significance. Rather, finding the same interaction effect in both studies, with different operationalizations of distributive justice, while moreover controlling for a host of different demographic (i.e,. education, gender) and psychological (i.e., deterrence, tax morale) background variables is strong evidence for its robustness. 
A second limitation is that we were unable to include all variables that are known to affect compliance. Therefore, we focused on the variables which we believed to be the most relevant to illustrate our main point concerning the role of self-interest motives in tax compliance. As such, variables like social norms (Wenzel, 2004a) and trust in the tax authorities (Scholz & Lubell, 1998) were omitted .Nevertheless, by controlling for those variables that we did include in the model, we have at least partly shown that our main finding is robust in various model specifications.
A third limitation is that a survey study implies that people report their behavior, or in this case, their behavioral intentions and attitudes. This has some predictive value for actual behavior (cf. Beck and Ajzen, 1991), but reported intentions and actual tax paying behavior may also be inconsistent (Elffers, 1991). However, it should be noted that although the reported intentions may not be a direct predictor for actual tax compliance behavior, our compliance measure is closely related to personal tax morale (Feld & Frey, 2002; Wenzel, 2004b), which is one of the most important explanatory concepts of actual compliance (Wenzel, 2004a). Indeed, in both studies, a direct measure of personal tax morale was strongly correlated with the tax compliance measure. And the presence of this important variable did not substantially influence the interaction between outcome favorability and distributive justice, thereby indicating the robustness of this effect.
A fourth limitation derives from the implicit causality claims of the models presented. Of course, cross-sectional designs can be misleading because important specifications may be missing or because the presumed causal effect is the other way around. For instance, Kirchler (2007) remarked that justice perceptions may be a rationalization of tax compliance instead of, or in addition to, a cause of tax compliance. There is also empirical evidence for this : Wenzel (2005) showed with cross-lagged panel data that there is, indeed, a causal relation between tax morale, justice perceptions and compliance, and that the direction of causality can be both ways. Thus, there is evidence that justice perceptions cause compliance, but such perceptions can also be constructions to rationalize (non-) compliant behavior. 
The same causal ambiguity exists in interpreting the relationship between deterrence and compliance. People may report higher levels of deterrence as a rationalization of their compliance. We have tried to tackle the causality problem by searching for adequate instrumental variables to be used in a two-stage least squares approach. Unfortunately, no variables were suiteable for this purpose. 
However, as noted in the introduction, experimental studies have yielded strong evidence that justice concerns affect compliance. And, in the extensive literature on social justice, many of these studies have shown that distributive justice, as well as outcome favorability, directly affect variables that are conceptually related to tax compliance (e.g, compliance with authorities; see for instance Colquit et al., 2001, and Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001, for meta analyses). Therefore, building on these results, and on the basis of theoretical predictions supported in a variety of different domains, we are  confident that our reasoning accurately reflects how our constructs relate to one another.  
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1.	There were no major differences between the two data collection methods.
2.	In study 1 the interaction between distributive justice and outcome favorability is also significant without the control variables specified in the model.
3.	To ensure that the distributive justice and outcome favourability scales actually capture two distinct factors, we conducted CFA. We decided to compare the two-factor model with the one-factor model. CFA indicated insufficient fit for the one-factor model (see Browne et al., 1993): 2(20) = 104.17, p < .001; 2 / df = 5,21; CFI = .87; IFI = .87; RMSEA = .11. The two-factor model showed a considerably improved, and indeed satisfactory fit: 2(14) = 32.77, p < .01, 2 / df = 2.34; RMSEA = .06; CFI = .97; IFI = .97.
4.	In study 2 the interaction between distributive justice and outcome favorability is also significant without the control variables specified in the model.





Study 1:  Dutch Fiscal Monitor

Compliance (5)	Some people pay less taxes because they do not declare all of their income or they exaggerate their deductions. This is called tax evasion, which is illegal, of course.- How acceptable do you find tax evasion of other people- Could you, under certain circumstances, decide to evade paying tax- How regrettable do you find: underreporting your income
- How regrettable do you find: exaggerating deductions- If I had the possibility, I would evade paying tax	1= not acceptable at all,
5= completely acceptable1= out of the question, 
5= highly probable1= very regrettable, 
7= not regrettable1= very regrettable, 
7= not regrettable1= completely disagree, 
5= completely agree
Distributive Justice (1)	- In my opinion the T.O. takes care that everyone pays the right amount of tax	1= completely disagree,
5= completely agree
Outcome favorability (2)	- Decisions of the T.O. are often favorable to me- I usually agree with the decisions of the T.O.	1= completely disagree,
5= completely agree
Personal Norm (1)	- I feel morally obliged to honestly declare all my tax liabilities	1= completely disagree,
5= completely agree
Detection Probability (3)	What do you think is the probability that the T.O. finds out that income is not declared or deductions are exaggeratedWhat do you think is the probability that the T.O. finds out that someone has received cash paymentsWhat do you think is the probability that the T.O. finds out that someone uses fiscal constructions to avoid paying tax	1= very low,
7= very high







Study 2: Dutch Employees Survey

Compliance (3)	Suppose you received € 500,- in cash payments for some small job. I would surely declare my cash payments to the T.O.  Under certain circumstances I may choose not to declare my cash paymentsI feel like not declaring my cash payments	**
Distributive Justice (5)	Compared to the tax I pay I receive too few public provisionsSome groups in society profit more from the tax system than I doIt is unfair that some people have to pay less taxes than me but at the same time, take advantage of all sorts of provisionsI think I have to pay too much taxI think the Dutch tax system is fair	****
Outcome favorability (3)	Decisions of the T.O. are often favorable to meI am satisfied with the decisions of the T.O. When I receive my tax liabilities, they are usually worse than I expected	*
Personal Norm (1)	- I feel morally obliged to pay all my taxes	
Detection Probability (3)	- The probability of being detected when evading tax is low- Someone who does not declare cash payments faces a rather high probability of being detected - The T.O. almost always finds out if someone has deducted too much money.	*
Sanction Severity (1)	- The punishment for tax evasion is rather severe	
Answering format 1= completely disagree, 5= completely agree
* answering format has been reversed in order to compute the indexes by averaging the items.

Table 1





Probability to Detection 	7	4.33	1.01				0.18***	.10**
Sanction Severity 	7	4.71	1.15					.09*
Personal tax Norm	5	4.21	0.81					
*: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001.
Table 2. 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Outcome Favorability and Distributive Justice on Compliance based on the Fiscal Monitor Survey (N=739).  
				
Dependent Variable: compliance				




























Probability to Detection 	5	3.07	0.73				 0.21***	.12*
Sanction Severity 	5	3.19	0.79					-.12*
Personal tax Norm	5	3.10	1.09					
*: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001.
Table 4. 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Outcome Favorability and Distributive Justice on Compliance based on the Dutch Employees Survey (N=357).  
				
Dependent Variable: compliance				






Probability to Detection (PD)		.13*	.13*	 .08
Sanction Severity (SS)		-.05	.01	 .03
SS x PD		-.02	-.02	 .03
				
Outcome Favorability (OF)			.12*	 .12*
Distributive Justice (DJ)			.23***	 .15*
OF x DJ			.12*	 .15**
				















Figure 2. Simple slopes analyses of interaction between Distributive Justice and Outcome Favorability based on Fiscal Monitor survey.

Figure 3. Simple slopes analyses of interaction between Distributive Justice and Outcome Favorability based on Employee’s survey.
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